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Control theory application in power market 
stability analysis 
Youfei Liu, Y.X.Ni, Senior Member, IEEE, and Felix F. Wu, Fellow, IEEE 
Abstract: This paper proposes a new framework to 
model the system dynamics and study the system 
stability for the quantity bidding competition in power 
market. From the viewpoint of control theory, the 
quantity bidding competition is modeled as close-loop 
dynamic system, where market price is the system 
feedback signal. Based on the objective of maximizing 
individual profit in a shot-game, a general dynamic 
process is given to describe supplier's adjustment 
behavior, which can he used to model all classical 
bidding strategy and CV-based bidding strategy. With 
the application of control theory, sufficient stability 
conditions and market equilibrium are presented. 
Computer test results support the analytic conclusion 
very well. 
Index Terms: Market dynamics and stability, quantity 
bidding competition, Power market, One-order inertia 
system, Negative feedback control system. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
ARKET dynamics and stability have long M been studied by economists. Generally, an 
economic system is dynamic if its behavior over 
time is determined by functional equations in which 
certain variables interact in an essential way with 
respect to time horizon. Given the dynamic 
processes, if they converge to some equilibrium 
position, then we conclude that it is stable. To model 
economic dynamics, differential or difference 
equations are widely adopted, thus the corresponding 
analysis is based on those differentiavdifference 
equation~"~['~""~~.Traditional analysis methods are 
eigenvalue technique, phase diagrams, Liapunov's 
direct method, etc. Recently, the application of game 
theory has drawn much research interest, especially 
in the competition game modeled by differential 
equations['". But till now, there is still no systematic 
way to study the market stability, and the market 
equilibrium with multi-players is still difficult to 
solve with strategic bidding impacts considered , 
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In recent years, competitions have been 
introduced to power industry in order to improve 
social welfare and market efficiency. The real power 
markets are usually oligopolistic and individual 
suppliers will conduct strategic biddings to seek 
maximum Therefore, it is an important task 
to study the power market dynamic behavior in time 
domain and analyze the power market stability and 
equilibrium. 
In the area of analysis of power market 
dynamics and stability, there has been little prior 
work. The first work came up in [2], where 
differentiavalgebraic equations and eigenvalue 
techniques are used to analyze the power market 
stability. It is found that the stability is essentially 
determined by the differential equation parameters, 
i.e., the suppliers' cost function parameters and the 
consumers' utility function parameters. But [2] did 
not make further study on bidding strategies and 
their impacts on market dynamics and stability. In 
[3], the market or bidding process is modeled as a 
closed-loop dynamic system in which previous and 
current information are used as a feedback signal. 
But it is based on a heuristic method and the given 
strategy is simple and non-general. In [4], the 
dynamics and mechanisms of bidding process are 
investigated. The dynamic model and system 
objectives are interpreted as a classical control 
problem. It is found that by introducing multiple 
bidding rounds, convergence to a Pareto optimum is 
possible if a PI control policy is introduced. 
However it considers a very special market situation, 
thus the corresponding results is not valid in a 
general case. 
In this paper, for a general quantity bidding 
competition in power market, we propose a new 
framework to model the market dynamics and 
analyze the market stability. The basic idea is to 
model the competition process as a close-loop 
dynamic system, where the public known 
information (i.e., the price) is the system feedback 
signal, and the individual outputs are control 
variables. Based on the maximizing-profit principle 
in economics, a general dynamic adjustment rule is 
defined, which can be used to model various 
classical bidding strategy (such as perfect 
competition, Cournot competition, Stackelherg 
competition, etc) and conjectural variation(CV)- 
based competition. It is shown that different bidding 
strategies can be modeled as one-order inertia 
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control blocks, and the system stability and 
equilibrium is analyzed using conventional control 
theory with bidding strategy impacts considered. 
This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 
presents a general formulation of quantity bidding 
competition in power market, and the case of perfect 
competition bidding strategy is used as an example 
first. Section 3 studies different kinds of bidding 
strategies and their impacts to market stability and 
equilibrium. Numerical tests are given in the section 
4 with conclusions drawn in section 5. 
11. POWERR MARKET DYNAMIC 
MODEL FORMULATION 
In order to make power market stability study, a 
general purpose power market dynamical model is 
formulated in this section, which is to be extended in 
section 3 for considering various bidding strategy 
impacts to power market stability and equilibrium. 
Basic assumptions made in this paper are as follows: 
there are n suppliers (generators) in power market 
with quadratic production cost function competing to 
each other in spot market to maximize their profit 
while serving the demand; the demand curve is 
linear and steady with respect to time (i.e., we only 
study the same hour of any day successively); 
electricity can not be stored, thus the power supply 
and demand are always balanced; and individual 
production cost functions are private and unknown to 
others; while the market clearing price is publicly 
known; generator i ( i =  l ; . . n )  needs to decide qi 
with respect to available market price p with certain 
time delay (i.e., the repeated biddings are considered 
as continuous events); generator capacity limits and 
network effects are neglected at this stage. 
Suppose the cost function of supplier (or 
generator) i is quadratic and the studied time period 
is one-hour, i.e: 
C i ( q i ) = a ,  +b,q,+-c.qZ i=l, . . . ,n ( I )  
where q, : power output of supplier i ; oi ,bi ,c i  : 
parameters of supplier i ’s cost function. The 
corresponding marginal cost function will be: 
I 
2 ‘ ” 
C 3 ! ( q i ) = b i + c i q i ,  = l . . .  1 ,  n (2) 
Assume that the electricity demand is linear and 
the corresponding inverse demand curve takes the 
form: 
where D : total demand; e ,  f : coefficients can be 
derived from historical records and publicly known , 
and e > 0 ,f > 0 ;  total supplyQ = cqi = D .  Thus 
for a specific total supply Q , the market clearing 
price p is determined by equation (3) .  
i=l 
Supplier i ’ s  profit function is defined by: 
In the market, each supplier will make its optimal 
decision on qi to maximize its profit based on 
market information. We assume supplier’s dynamic 
response can be described by ‘ “ I :  
zi = mi -ci(qi) (4) 
where Ai is a factor representing the speed of 
adjustment or the preference of adjustment intensity. 
Equation ( 5 )  indicates that suppliers will adjust their 
outputs in the direction of increasing profit. 
If a power market is perfectly competitive, 
price p in (4) is independent to individual qi , the 
Stability of perfect competition market is easy to 
analyze. However the real power market is usually 
oligopolistic and price p is dependent to 
qi (i = I;..,n). As we all know in power markets 
that qi is private information, and individual 
suppliers will conduct strategic biddings in real 
oligopolistic power markets. As a result, market 
stability is of great concern and its analysis is non- 
trivial. In this paper, market dynamic model under 
perfect competition will be derived first. It will then 
be modified to meet different bidding strategies so as 
to study their impacts on market dynamics. 
In perfect competition, no one can influence the 
market price, i.e.,ap/ayi = 0 . Based on equations ( I )  
and (4), we know: 
- 3% - p -(bi +cc iq i )=  ( p  - bi)-ciqi  (6a) 
aqi 
And the first order condition for maximizing the 
profit is given by: 
0 (6h) 
air, 
84; 
-= 
Defining an apparent ‘price’ (a coordinate shift to 
simplify the notation): 
Substituting (6a) into (3, supplier i ’s 
adjustment rule is: 
p i  = p - b ,  (7) 
dynamic 
By Laplace transformation, the corresponding 
transfer function of (8) takes the form: 
1 
Equations (8) and (9) show that the supplier strategy 
in a perfect competition spot market corresponds to a 
first-order inertia control system with gain and time 
constant taken as: 
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It is reasonable that IargerA, corresponds to smaller 
time constant, i.e., faster adjustment; and that larger 
ci , which means faster cost raising along with 
output increasing, will lead to smaller Ki  and Ti , 
The system block diagram for perfect competition is 
shown in Fig. 1. 
I t  I 
"r"" [ G,(S)=- 
I 1  
Fig. 1. System diagram for dynamic adjustmcnt process 
From control theory, the system will be stable 
if all the poles of the system close-loop transfer 
function have negative real parts, which is equivalent 
to that all the system eigenvalues have negative real 
parts using state-space equation notation. In order 
to simplify global system (See Fig. I)  stability, we 
introduce the following proposition. 
Proposition: For a system wifhfirst-order open-loop 
transfer fincfions shown in Fig. I ,  if all open-loop 
transfer finclions are stable, fhen the close-loop 
system is stable. (See Appendix A for proof.) 
From equation (9), the open-loop system poles 
(See Fig. 1) are given by: 
l+S,T, = O  or S i  =-/lci ,  i = l ; . . , n ( ~ ~ )  
Hence, the perfect competition market stability 
condition is simply ( .; Ai > 0 ): 
S , < O  or ci>O, i=l;.. ,n (12) 
Assuming that ci > 0 (i = 1,. . ., n )  and according to 
(3) and (6), the market clearing price at individual 
optimum decisions or system equilibrium 
dq.  an. 
dt aqi (.;-=A.-=O, i = l ; . . , n  ) willhe: 
Fig. 1 and (14) show that although supplier 
i (i = I ; . . n )  does not know his rival's 
( b j , c i )  ( j  t i ) ,  so far as he behaves according to (5) 
in a perfect competition market, the market will be 
stable and converge to ( p * , q * )  , where 
r T  
4' = ( 4 : , - % J  
It should be pointed out that Fig. I is a general 
purpose system diagram for power markets. Actually 
different kinds of transfer function Gi (.) can be used 
to simulate various bidding strategies in oligopolistic 
power markets and their impacts on power market 
stability can be studied in detail. This is done in the 
next section. 
Ill. POWER MARKET STABILITY ANALYSIS 
WITH DIFFERENT BIDDING STRATEGIES 
A .  Cotimot competition case 
The real power markets are usually 
oligopolistic rather than perfect competition, where a 
few suppliers might have noticeable market shares. 
Strategic biddings are utilized to maximize 
individual profits. Among various bidding strategies, 
Coumot competition model is widely used. Under 
Coumot competition, each supplier makes his 
decision assuming others have certain outputs, i.e., 
aqj /aqi  = 0 ( j f i ).Therefore, azi/aqi is ( .; 
a p / J q i  = - f a d  p = e - f C q , ) :  
i=l 
= ( p  - b j )  - (f + ci)qi, i = I,. , . , n 
and from ( 5 )  the dynamic adjustment rule will be 
( p i  = p - b , ) :  
Based on (16), we can obtain the following 
individual transfer function for Coumot competition 
as: 
(13) 
p ' - b ,  
p ' = e - f C q :  = e - f C -  
,=I ,=I cr 
p' can be solved kom (13) and the system stable 
equilibrium is: 
As compared with perfect competition, the only 
difference is ci in (9) is replaced by ( f + ci ) in (1 7) 
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dq I 
dt 
- = A, 
to include q, 's impact on price p ,  and hence on the 
profit zi . The system diagram is the same as Fig. 1. 
Based on the proposition in the paper, the sufficient 
condition for power market stability of Coumot 
competition will be simply ('; Ai > 0):  
Usually f > 0 , (18) is surely satisfied if ci is 
positive. 
Similarly the stable equilibrium of the system can be 
solved for as: 
f + c i  > O ,  i = l , . . . , n  (18) 
supplier i 's rivals: 
+cI 4, , a , > o  CV-, = XCK, = - (27) 
Assuming CV-, can h:obsexved in terms of power 
" 
89j 
j=,,j*i j=l.j*i 8% 
" f  
PI - f + f i=2 I 
B. Stackelberg competition case 
In Stackelberg competition, there are two 
different types of suppliers, i.e. leaders and 
followers. For convenience, let supplier 1 he the 
leader and the others the followers. For followers, it 
can be proven[12' that their behaviors are similar to 
firms in Coumot competition and taking 
89, /8q, = 0 ( i E followers ). Thus, the following 
sufficient conditions for system stability should be 
satisfied: 
f + c i  > O ,  i=2;..,n (20) 
For the leader, he knows that the followers will react 
to his strategy similar to Coumot competition, 
therefore az1/r3q, can be derived as 
j=l 
Based on the proposition in the paper, the 
corresponding sufficient condition for market 
stability of the leader can be derived similar to (16) 
and (1 7) of Coumot competition as ( ': AI > 0 ): 
" f  
+cI > O  (23) 
c, 
,+E, i=2 
f + f '=2" 
f 
In terms of (20) and (23), the sufficient conditions 
for integrated power market stability are: 
I +r 
L f +ci 
f + f ;=2" +c1 > o  f (24) I I+=?- 
%f +ci I f +ci > O ,  i = 2 ; . . , n  
Usually f > 0 and ci > 0 (i = 1;. . , n )  , hence (24) 
can be satisfied and the market is stable. The stable 
equilibrium can be derived without difficulty: 
-I 
" f  
C. Bidding strategy based on conjectural variation 
conceDt 
i ~ 
(22) market historical records and CV-, is constant, 
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d z i / d q i  of supplier i will be ( p = e - fc qi ): 
i=l 
= (p - b, )- (f + fCY_,  + ci hi, i = I,.. . ,n  
The corresponding dynamic adjustment rule is: 
~ = a i [ p i - ( f + f c Y . , + C i ~ , ~  ai >o, i = ~ , . . . , n  
dt 
(29) 
The individual transfer functions in Fig. 1 can be 
derived based on (29) as: 
1 
1 
4i(S) - f + f C Y - ,  +c i  
P i V )  I +  
Gi (S) = -- 
ai + fcv-, + ci (30) 
and the sufticient stability condition for the power 
market is: 
The system equilibrium is given by: 
f + f C Y - i  +ci >O, i= l ; . . ,n  (31) 
" = i= l  
It can be that classical game 
theoretical bidding strategies are corresponding to 
specific CY., values. For example, CY., = -1 
corresponds to perfect competition strategy; and 
CV_, = 0 corresponds to Coumot competition 
strategy, and CY_, = ci c- corresponds to 
j + i  'i 
collusion['31. For a rational supplier, his bidding 
strategy should be in-between perfect competition 
and collusion. Therefore we have 
1 
1 
- I  5 CY-, 5 ci c- and the sufficient stability 
j+i  c i  
condition (31) can be ci > O  ( i = l ; . . , n  ) since 
f + f C Y - ,  t o .  
Dynamic CY Case 
When CY-, evolves with respect to time, i.e., 
CY-, is dynamic, a key issue for a supplier is how to 
make adaptive estimation of CV-, using available 
market data. Define dynamic conjecture variation as 
follows: 
where ' dq-, ' is a rivals' integrated differential with 
respect to the differential of ' dqi '. From equation 
(3), we can obtain: 
dp, = dp = - fdQ = - f c d q i  = - fdqi - fdq-i (34) 
or 
i=l 
Then 
It is easy to prove that under the new CV 
definition (33), and for the extreme case of perfect 
competition, the CY_, is still equal to (-1) 
dP, - 0 for perfect competition). It is clear that a 
4, 
rational supplier will take dynamic CY-, t -1 . 
The system diagram for adaptive CV-based 
competitive power market is shown in Fig. 2 with 
G,(S) and v,(q,,p,) defined in (30) and (36) 
respectively. 
I I I I 
Fig. 2. System diagram with adaptive ConjCcNre competition 
In adaptive CV-based competition, although the 
transfer function parameters (K, ,Ti  ) are functions 
of dynamic CY-, and time-varying, for a specific 
instantaneous CY-, (2 - I ) ,  each supplier's control 
system is still a first-order system. As long as the 
open-loop system poles are negative all the time, the 
system will keep stable. Therefore the sufficient 
condition for system stability is still (': CY_, t -1): 
f + f C V - i + c i > c i > O ,  i = l ; . . , n  (37) 
It is easy to know that when CY-, moves off 
from negative unity towards positive, the system 
will become more and more stable, which means 
that Cournot competition (where CY-, = 0 ) is 
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more stable than perfect competition (where 
CV-, = - I )  in the sense of short time period of 
price transients under same disturbances. 
1V. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
The IEEE 6-generator 30-bus system is used to 
demonstrate the proposed method. The supplier 
parameters (including the cost function coefficients 
and dynamic adjustment parameters) are listed in 
Table 1. 
TABLE I 
Cost function coefficients and dynamic adjustment parametea 
Suvvlicr I 1; I a;  I b; I Ci .. I 
I 1 3 1  0 1  2 I 0.02 
2 ( 4 1  o I  I .  75 I o.017.i 
3 I 2.5 I 0 I 3 I 0.025 
4 1 3 1  0 1  3 I 0.025 
5 1 2 1  0 1  I I 0.0625 
6 1 4 1  o I  3.25 I 0.00834 
Assume that the inverse demand function is known 
as: 
6 
p = 5 0 - 0 . 0 2 D = 5 0 - 0 . 0 2 ~ q i  (38) 
i = l  
A .Test case 1: perject competition 
Table 2 illustrates the system equilibrium and 
eigenvalues for perfect competition. The system 
eigenvalues are calculated through state space 
equation (See appendix ). As all the eigenvalues are 
negative, the system is stable, which can also be 
verified by the stability condition (13). The 
corresponding system equilibrium is solved from 
TABLE 11 
Equilibrium and dynamic charactenstics under perfect 
competition ( p'=8,9685$fMWh) 
(14). 
-0.4380 
-0,1171 
- 0.0405 
- 0.0612 
- 0.0659 
Given any initial condition, we can simulate the 
system time response. Fig. 3 shows the time 
response with the initial condition qi(0) = 0 
( i = l ; . . , n ) ,  where time unit is fictitious and used 
only for observations of qi 's evolution. 
U I 
D 20 40 BO 80 f *a 
tine(p.u.1 
Fig. 3 .  Time response of suppliers' outputs under perfect 
competition 
It should he pointed out that the dynamic 
adjustment parameter Ai will not influence the 
system stability, hut it will affect the time response, 
as shown in Fig. 3, where suppliers 3 and 4 have the 
same cost function coefficients with different 
adjustment parameters ( A3 = 2.5 , A4 = 3 ) ,and 
supplier 4 has a faster initial rising in output than 
supplier 3. 
B. Test case 2: Cournot competition 
Under Coumot competition, all suppliers' 
CV_, are held as constant 0. Table 3 shows the 
equilibrium and eigenvalues for Coumot competition. 
As all the eigenvalues are negative, the system is 
stable. Comparing the results with Table 2, we know 
that the system eigenvalues under Coumot 
competition are more negative, which means the 
market is more stable. 
TABLE I11 
Equilibrium and dynamic characteristics under Coumot 
competition (p'=14.76$/MWh). 
Fig. 4 shows the time evolution of suppliers' 
outputs. Comparing to test case 1 of perfect 
competition, Coumot competition will lead to lower 
total output and a higher market clearing price, and 
has a relatively faster response towards equilibrium. 
Moreover we can see that the individual profits are 
much higher than in test case 1. 
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~~ ..................................................... 
=--I - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _  
Y 
40 60 80 100 
t imebu .  ) 
Fig. 4. Time response of suppliers' outputs undcr C o w "  
comoctition 
In the same way, we have simulated more 
cases such as Stackelberg competition, constant 
and adaptive CV-based competition, etc. The test 
results match the analytic conclusions very well. The 
results will not be presented here. 
V. CONLUSION 
From the viewpoint of control theory, this paper 
proposes a general framework for modeling market 
dynamics and analyzing market stability for the 
quantity bidding competition in power markets. The 
basic idea is to model the quantity bidding process as 
a close-loop dynamic system ,where market price is 
the system feedback signal.Based on the maximizing 
profit principle in economics, this paper suggests a 
general output adjustment rule, which is suitable for 
modeling various classical competition strategies and 
CV-based bidding strategies. Propositions are proved 
for fast market stability judgment. The sufficient 
condition and market equilibrium under various 
bidding strategies are presented in this paper. 
Numerical test results support the analytic 
conclusions very well. 
VI. APPENDIX 
Proposition I :  For a linear system A.k = BX , i f A  is 
a positive definite matrix and BT = B , then there 
exists an invertible matrix Q such that Q'AQ = I 
and Q'BQ is a diagonal matrix. and the condition 
far the system to be stable is that matrix B is 
negative definite. 
Proof: Since A is positive definite matrix, then there 
exists an invertible matrix Q, such that QTAQ, = I  , 
Consider the symmetry matrix Q:BQl, we have an 
orthogonal matrix U such that cirQTBQIU is a 
diagonal matrix1I3'. Let Q = QIU , then Q is the 
required matrix such that Q r A Q =  I and Q'BQ . 
Through a linear transformation X = QY , it yields: 
Q'AQY = Q'BQY (A-1) 
Hence: 
Y = Q'BQY (A-2) 
From linear system theory, we know that the linear 
transformation will not change the property of 
system stability. Therefore, if system 1' = Q'BQY 
is stable, the system h = B X  is stable too. For 
system Y = Q'BQY to he stable, it requires that the 
symmetrical matrix QTBQ is negative definite. For 
matrix QTBQ to be negative definite, given any 
vectorU , it must satisfy the following condition: 
U'Q'BQU < 0 (A-3) 
Denote a new vector V = QU , we can have: 
V'BV < 0 ('4-4) 
That is to say, matrix B should be negative definite. 
Q E D  
Proposition 2: For a matrix taking the form 
~ 
If the following condition is satisfied: 
then the matrix B is negative definite 
Proofi For any nonzero vector x =(x1,x2;.~,x,)', 
we have: 
x r Bx = - c c i x '  - f ( x ,  + x2 +. . . + x,? < - c c i x i  2 
i=l ;=I 
If ci > O ,  i= l ; . . ,n  , 
thatx'Bx < 0 .  
then it is clear to know 
Q.E.D 
Proposition 3: For a system with first-order open- 
loop transferfinctions shown in Fig. I ,  ifall open- 
loop transfer functions are stable, then the close- 
loop system is stable. 
Proof: The system shown by Fig. I is a coupled 
negative feedback control system, in order to study 
the system stability we model the system with state 
space equation. Without loss of generality, consider 
the perfect competition case, thus we have: 
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Then, from proposition 1, the stability of above 
system requires that matrix A,,, is negative definite 
As f 2  0 , from proposition 2, the sufficient 
condition for the system given by (A-7) to be stable 
is: 
c; > o  (A-9) 
which means that if all the poles of open-loop 
transfer function are negative, or all the open-loop 
transfer functions are stable, the close-loop system is 
stable. 
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